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Abstract
T h i sp a p e ri sa na t t e m p tt od e v e l o pau n i ﬁed approach to endoge-
nous heterogeneity by constructing general class of two-player symmetric
games that always possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
These classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two
general properties: payoﬀ non-concavities and some form of strategic sub-
stitutability. We provide a detailed discussion of the relationship of this
work with Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking framework and with business
strategy literature. Our framework generalizes a number of models deal-
ing with two-stage games, with long term investment decisions in the ﬁrst
stage and product market competition in the second stage. We present
the main examples that motivate this study to illustrate the generality of
our approach.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most pervasive presumptions in modern economic analysis is the
symmetric nature of interacting agents. While often intended solely as a sim-
plifying assumption on ap r i o r igrounds, this presumption has also permeated
economic thinking for a variety of other reasons. When considering noncooper-
ative games, analysts often restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium points
even when other asymmetric outcomes exist and may reﬂect more rational-
izable or more pertinent behavior. In mechanism design or policy games, the
social planner typically assumes identical treatment of identical agents, although
global optimality might dictate otherwise. The design of various forms of joint
ventures is also subject to a similar observation.
In most cases, the only justiﬁcation beyond simplicity is what Schelling
(1960) convincingly termed the focal nature of symmetric equilibrium outcomes.
Indeed, it is widely recognized that inter-agent heterogeneity is often a critical
dimension of several economic and social phenomena. From a positive perspec-
tive, heterogeneity is simply a necessary postulate to account for the simple fact
that in the real world, one seldom observes identical agents, be it individuals,
ﬁrms, industries or countries. In a similar vein, even from a normative stand-
point, diﬀerences across interacting agents often constitute a necessary condition
for many important economic activities such as trade or risk-sharing.
Understanding the origins and/or evolution of diversity across economic
agents or disparities in economic performance across regions is increasingly per-
ceived as a central goal of economic and social research in a number of diﬀerent
areas (see e.g. Geroski et al. (2003) and Ghemawat (1986) ). Macroeconomists
attempt to explain the causes of booms and recessions. Development economists
wish to understand the forces behind poor and strong economic performances.
Labor economists attempt to get a handle on discriminatory treatment of some
groups of workers. Business strategists and industrial economists devote a lot
of attention to the sources and sustainability of inter-ﬁrm heterogeneity within
and across industries. Overall, much eﬀort has been expanded with a view to
2explain ”the diversity across space, time and groups” (Matsuyama, 2002).
In view of the diversity of economic research areas involved in this eﬀort, it
is not surprising that various conceptual and methodological approaches have
b e e nd e v e l o p e di nc o n n e c t i o nw i t ht h i sc o m p l e xt a s k . W h i l eo f t e nt a i l o r e dt o
as p e c i ﬁc area, each of these approaches is broad in explanatory scope and
has wide potential applicability. We now brieﬂy review three of these general
paradigms that share some relationship to the present paper.
The dominant approach, based on coordination failures, postulates a game
with strategic complementarities and multiple Pareto-ranked pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium points. Diversity is then synonymous with making diﬀerent equilib-
rium selections, with the high-performing entity picking the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium and the low-performing entity failing to do so. This argument is
thus generally predicated on the presence of two identical and non-interacting
economies, each operating under a diﬀerent equilibrium out of the same equi-
librium set. It may also be invoked to explain diversity across time within the
same economy, with booms and recessions corresponding to operation under the
Pareto dominant and inferior equilibria respectively. This literature includes as
key studies Cooper and John (1988), Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1989), and
is surveyed by Cooper (1999).
The coordination failures approach has been criticized for failing to oﬀer
any compelling argument for the diversity in equilibrium selections in the two-
economy model or for the regime switch in the one-economy model. Matsuyama
(2002) proposes a modiﬁcation of the former model by creating an interac-
tive link between the two sub-economies and allowing the two players to take
two decisions, one in each sub-economy. Under some conditions on the larger
game with ap r i o r iidentical players, namely that the players’ actions are pair-
wise strategic complements and each player’s actions are substitutes due to a
ﬁxed total resource constraint, multiple equilibria arise with the property that
the symmetric equilibrium is unstable while the two asymmetric equilibria are
stable, both in the sense of Cournot dynamics. Endogenous heterogeneity in
this approach is then predicated on the central postulate that only Cournot-
3stable equilibria are observable outcomes of this complex game, any of which
would involve each agent taking diﬀerent actions in the two ex ante identical
sub-economies. Matsuyama (2000, 2002, 2004) coined the term ”symmetry-
breaking” to refer to this heterogeneity-generating process.
The third approach originates in the business strategy literature, and is often
presented as part of a general critique of economic theory. With their traditional
emphasis on investigating the workings of ﬁrms as complex organizations, strat-
egy scholars have been particularly concerned with understanding the sources
and dynamics of inter-ﬁrm heterogeneity along various functions and charac-
teristics. In the dominant view, as articulated by Nelson and Winter (1982),
ﬁrms operate in such highly complex and ever-changing environments that they
entertain no hope of ever accumulating enough knowledge about their world
to view it as a strategic game or formulate a precise game-theoretic strategy
to guide their overall behavior. Rather, ﬁrms grope for economic performance
via a heuristic learning process of trial and error and the continual updating
of routines and rules of thumb eschewing optimization. In this evolutionary
vision, heterogeneity is simply an inevitable outcome of this groping behavior,
with ﬁrms ending up with diﬀerent heuristic strategies and core capabilities to
implement them. These ”discretionary” diﬀerences can then be sustained over
extended periods of time due to the presence of barriers to successful imitation
generated by the diﬀerences in core competencies, and also by forces of path
dependence in the evolution of ﬁrms’ choices. This literature often criticizes
economic theory for not adequately accounting for inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences, other
than postulating them either as reﬂecting variations in initial conditions, or as
exogenous consequences of the luck of a draw in stochastic models. This failure
is attributed to the fact that economic theorists persist, as part of their excessive
reliance on complete rationality, in ”taking a ﬁrm’s choice sets as obvious to it
and the best choice similarly clear and obvious” (Nelson, 1991).1
1An interesting development over the last two decades is a strand of literature straddling the
traditional boundaries between industrial organization and business strategy and addressing
issues of interest to both ﬁelds, making them increasingly related: See Shapiro (1989), Rumelt,
4The present paper constitutes an attem p tt oc o n t r i b u t et ot h i sr i c hd e b a t e
along standard lines of argument in applied game theory and industrial orga-
nization. Consider a two-player symmetric normal-form game characterized by
two key properties: (a) actions form strategic substitutes, and (b) each player’s
payoﬀ, though continuous, admits a key nonconcavity along the diagonal in ac-
tion space, which results in a jump of the reaction correspondence across the 45o
line. Such a game always admits pure-strategy Nash equilibrium points due sim-
ply to the property of strategic substitutes. Furthermore, due to property (b),
no such equilibrium could ever be symmetric. At any of the possibly multiple
equilibria, which obviously occur in pairs due to the symmetry of the game, oth-
erwise identical agents will necessarily take diﬀerent equilibrium actions. While
this description exactly ﬁts the main result of the paper, we consider two other
related classes of games that always possess asymmetric, but never symmetric,
pure-strategy equilibria although they are, strictly speaking, not of strategic
substitutes. This suggests that the latter property is not as critical as the diag-
onal nonconcavity property in generating exclusively asymmetric outcomes.
Since payoﬀs are continuous in actions in all three classes of games under con-
sideration, these games will typically admit a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). As this would be the only focal
equilibrium in the sense of Schelling (1960), it may reasonably be advanced as a
plausible outcome of such a game. Nevertheless, in the actual realization of the
equilibrium randomizations, the players will still end up playing diﬀerent actions
with high, if not full, probability. Hence, given a focus on explaining observed
heterogeneity, this approach need not rule out mixed strategies ap r i o r i .
Towards the goal of generating endogenous heterogeneity, this approach is
obviously closest in spirit to Matsuyama’s symmetry-breaking explanation. By
allowing for suitable discontinuities in the players’ reaction curves, it dispenses
with the need to interconnect two separate games in the somewhat complex
(and subtle) manner proposed by Matsuyama. More importantly, it also pro-
vides a framework that is independent of the controversial argument of outright
Schendel and Teece (1991), Roller and Sinclair-Desgagne (1996).
5rejecting Cournot-unstable equilibria. Indeed, even when one ignores the focal
nature derived from their symmetry, it is worthwhile to observe that these equi-
libria cannot be ruled out on account of any of the standard Nash equilibrium
reﬁnements, such as normal-form perfection or strategic stability (Kohlberg and
Mertens, 1986).2 Furthermore, in an experimental setting involving a symmet-
ric two-player game with one unstable symmetric equilibrium and a pair of
asymmetric equilibria, Cox and Walker (1998) found little support in the data
for any of the three equilibria. This provocative ﬁnding suggests that while a
Cournot-unstable equilibrium of a given game may be justiﬁably regarded as
unobservable, it does not thereby follow that some Cournot-stable equilibrium
of the same game will necessarily prevail and thus be observable. Rather, the
presence of both Cournot-stable and unstable equilibria may engender a high
level of indeterminacy, which may critically reduce the predictive power of the
game.
Our ﬁndings may also be advanced as a rebuttal to the aforementioned
criticism from the business strategy literature. Indeed, while sharing their mo-
tivation for understanding intra-industry heterogeneity, this approach underlies
a general methodology for generating inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences out of a strategic
game with fully rational and completely informed players. The contrast with
the evolutionary explanation is rather striking. Instead of discretionary diﬀer-
ences that inevitably arise out of the idiosyncratic heuristic response that each
ﬁrm develops in isolation from other ﬁrms as a result of its multi-faceted op-
eration in an extremely complex environment, we uncover strategic diﬀerences
that arise out of a fully-ﬂedged game-theoretic interaction amongst ﬁrms in a
simple and completely known environment. We will return to this contrast in
the speciﬁc context of an R&D game in a subsequent section.
The present paper may also be motivated in relation to various broad strands
of literature in industrial economics dealing in some way with strategic endoge-
2Indeed, they are typically strict Nash equilibria (in the sense that a unilateral deviation
will lead to a strict loss for the deviator), and thus would survive any of the well-known
reﬁnements.
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comes to mind is concerned with product diﬀerentiation. In a myriad of two-
stage games where each ﬁrm chooses a quality level or a horizontal characteristic
in the ﬁrst stage, and then a price for its product in the second stage, endoge-
nous heterogeneity naturally emerges out of the ﬁrms’ perception that identical
choices in the ﬁrst stage will lead to zero proﬁts in the second stage Bertrand
competition due to the resulting homogeneity of the products. See in particular
Gabszewics and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982) for vertical product
diﬀerentiation and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) for horizontal product diﬀeren-
tiation with a non uniform density. The present paper will direcly generalize
Motta (1993) and Aoki and Prusa (1996).
The second, extensive literature deals with inﬁnite-horizon industry dynam-
ics allowing for entry and exit. One class of models, exempliﬁed by Jovanovic
(1982), postulates perfectly competitive ﬁrms for which diﬀerences emerge due
to exogenous idiosyncratic technology shocks. Another class is formed by studies
that do generate endogenous heterogeneity in long run dynamics by considering
ﬁrms that invest in capacity expansion (e.g. Besanko and Doraszelski, 2002)
or R&D (e.g. Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2004). Simpler two-stage models
with similar ﬂavor but without entry and exit also generate endogenous diﬀer-
ences amongst competing ﬁrms: Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and Maggi (1996)
for capacity expansion and Amir and Wooders (1999, 2000) for R&D.
There are several other studies in various areas of industrial organization
where endogenous heterogeneity emerges in a strategic setting. Hermalin (1994)
deals with a two-stage game where ﬁrms’ choices of managerial structures take
place before market competition. Mills (1996) and Amir (2000) deal with R&D
games giving rise to equilibrium outcomes with maximal heterogeneity only, i.e.
full R&D by one ﬁrm and no R&D by the rival.3 In public economics Mintz
3Another strand of literature, not directly related to our setting, deals with endogenous
heterogeneity arising out of hybrid models of joint ventures where ﬁrms make a cooperative
decision in the ﬁrst stage followed by product market competition in the second stage: See
e.g. Salant and Shaﬀer (1998,1999) and Long and Soubeyran (2001).
7and Tulkens (1986) exhibit asymmetric tax rates for identical member states.
As a second motivation, the present paper is an attempt to develop a unifying
approach to understanding symmetry-breaking mechanisms in general classes
of two-player games, encompassing many of the cited studies. These two-stage
models share two key features that are critical for the symmetry-breaking ar-
guments they present. The ﬁrst is a fundamental nonconcavity in the payoﬀs,
which may be conﬁned to the diagonal in action space or hold globally, and the
second is some form of strategic substitutes in ﬁrst-period actions, possibly of
an abstract sort (more on this in Section 4). While there is quite some variation
in the precise manner versions of these two features are present and interact
across all the models, we will be able to capture most of them in three separate
general results, which though quite distinct at ﬁrst sight, nonetheless bear some
deﬁnite relationship at an abstract level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the overall set-up. Sec-
tion 3 provides the results on the exclusive existence of asymmetric equilibria
for submodular payoﬀ functions. Section 4 deals with nonsubmodular payoﬀ
functions and Section 5 presents the results for games with convex payoﬀs. Sec-
tion 6 discusses an extension to ordinal complementarity and substitutability
conditions. Each section provides a summary of the relevant applications the re-
sults pertain to. The appendix provides a brief overview of the supermodularity
notions and results.
2S e t u p
This section lays out the general notation for use throughout the paper. The
nooncooperative game described below may be a simple one-shot game or it may
represent the payoﬀs of a two-stage game as a function of the ﬁrst period actions,
where the unique second stage pure-strategy equilibrium has been substituted
in. In the latter case, which actually covers most of the applications of this
paper, we obviously restrict consideration to subgame-perfect equilibria and
analyze the resulting one-shot game.
8Consider a two-player normal form game Γ given by the tuple (X,Y,F,G).
Let X and Y be the action sets of player 1 and 2 respectively, such that X =
Y =[ 0 ,c] ⊂ R. The maps F and G : X × Y → R are the payoﬀ functions of
















Observe that, somewhat contrary to standard practice, the ﬁrst argument of
F is the action of player 1 while the ﬁrst argument of G is the action of player
2.I ti su s e f u lt od e ﬁne the following sets:
∆U = {(x,y) ∈ R2 : x ≥ y} and ∆L = {(x,y) ∈ R2 : x ≤ y}.
It will be assumed throughout the paper that U, L, F and G are jointly con-
tinuous functions of the two actions. Deﬁne the best response correspondences
(reaction curves) for players 1 and 2 respectively as r1(y) = argmax{F(x,y):
x ∈ [0,c]} and r2 (x) = argmax{G(y,x):y ∈ [0,c]}.
As usual, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (or PSNE for short), (x∗,y∗) ∈
[0,c]2 is said to be symmetric if x∗ = y∗, and asymmetric otherwise. It follows
from the symmetry of the game that if (x∗,y∗) is a PSNE, (y∗,x ∗) is also a
PSNE.
Each of the next three sections investigates a separate class of normal-form
symmetric games that always possess asymmetric Nash equilibria and no sym-
metric Nash equilibria. For each of the three classes, we provide a general result
establishing both the existence and the inexistence conclusions and an illustra-
tion based on previous studies where a special case of the result was derived in
a speciﬁc setting.
The deﬁnitions and main results from the theory of supermodular games
used in this paper are reviewed in the appendix in a very simple way, which is
suﬃcient for the purposes of this paper.
93 Endogenous heterogeneity with strategic sub-
stitutes
In this section, we consider a two-player symmetric normal-form game charac-
terized by two key properties. The ﬁrst is that actions form strategic substitutes.
This means that an increase in one player’s strategy lowers the other player’s
marginal returns to increasing his own strategy. As a result, players respond
optimally to an increase of the opponent’s choice with a decrease of their own
variable. In other words, the best reply correspondences are downward-sloping
and a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists (see, Vives, 1990 and Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990).
The second key property is that each player’s payoﬀ, though jointly contin-
uous in the two actions, admits a fundamental nonconcavity along the 45o line,
giving rise to a canyon shape along the diagonal. A key consequence of this
feature is that a player would never optimally respond to an action of the rival
by playing that same action.
Taken together, these two properties imply that each best reply is a de-
creasing correspondence with a (downward) jump over the 45o line.4 Hence,
no PSNE could ever be symmetric. At any of the possibly multiple equilib-
ria, which obviously occur in pairs due to the symmetry of the game, ex ante
identical agents will necessarily take diﬀerent equilibrium actions.
While all three results presented in this paper share this same ﬂavor, the
main result in terms of the generality of the assumptions and thus of the scope
of applicability is this section’s.
4In this paper, we will say that a function f : R → R is increasing (strictly increasing) if
x0 >ximplies f(x0) ≥ (>)f(x). A correspondence is increasing if its maximal and minimal
selections are increasing functions (as in the conclusion of Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem).
103.1 The results
Diﬀerent subsets of the following assumptions will be needed for our conclusions
below. The notation is as laid out in Section 2.5 A full discussion of the
a s s u m p t i o n sa n dr e s u l t si sp r e s e n t e dat the end of the section. Most of the
proofs can be found in the appendix.
A1 U, L are submodular
A2 U1(x,x) >L 1(x,x),∀x ∈ (0,c)
A3 U1(0,0) > 0,L 1(c,c) < 0
A1 says that on either side of the diagonal, but not necessarily globally,
each player’s marginal returns to increasing his action decrease with the rival’s
action. A2 holds that each player’s payoﬀ, though globally continuous in the
two actions, has a kink along the diagonal in the shape of a ”valley”. The role
of A3 is simply to rule out PSNEs at (0,0) or (c,c).
These assumptions form a suﬃciently general framework to encompass many
of the studies mentioned in Section 1 as illustrated below. Furthermore, all three
assumptions are easy to check in a particular model.
Theorem 3.1 Assume that A1−A3 hold. Then the game Γ is of strategic sub-
stitutes, has at least one pair of asymmetric PSNEs and no symmetric PSNEs.
The idea of the proof is that overall submodularity of the payoﬀ function is
inherited from the submodularity of its components U and L in the presence
of assumption A2. We know from Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem that global
submodularity of the payoﬀ function implies globally decreasing best replies.
Assumptions A2 − A3 imply that the best replies have a downward jump that
crosses over the diagonal. This situation is depicted in ﬁgure 1.6 (We caution the
5In addition, throughout the paper, partial derivatives are denoted by a subindex corre-





6Notice that unusually x is the variable in the vertical axis. This corresponds to analyzing
t h eg a m ef r o mt h ep o i n to fv i e wo fp l a y e r1 that chooses x as a response to y. We maintain
this convention throughout.
11Figure 1: Decreasing reaction curves have a jump along the diagonal, and there
is no symmetric equilibrium
reader that the continuity of the reaction curves in each triangle over and below
the diagonal is only there for the sake of a clearer ﬁgure. It needs not hold under
assumptions A1- A3). The ﬁrst result gives us existence of equilibrium via the
strategic substitutes property, and the second precludes symmetric equilibria.
The complete proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 3.1 does not rule out the existence of multiple pairs of PSNEs. In-
deed, the two reaction curves may intersect several times above and below the
diagonal. In case of multiple pairs of PSNEs, there will typically be co-existence
of pairs of Cournot-stable and pairs of Cournot-unstable PSNEs. Neverthe-
less, Theorem 3.1 does imply that all of these PSNEs are asymmetric. Hence
symmetry-breaking in this context does not rely on the rejection of Cournot-
unstable symmetric PSNEs. In the same vein, this type of symmetry-breaking
is not at odds with Schelling’s (1960) notion of focalness of PSNEs.
The next result adds further restrictions of a general nature on the payoﬀ
components of our game that lead to a unique pair of PSNEs, which are then
necessarily Cournot-stable.7 In this case, symmetry-breaking is coupled with
7It is worthwhile to point out here that our results indicate an even total number of PSNEs,
in apparent conﬂict with the well-known odd number results. The explanation is that the latter
results are based on degree theory and require continuity of the best-response form. Given
12more predictive power of the game, although the selection of one PSNE from
the pair still remains indeterminate, as is standard in symmetric settings.8
Theorem 3.2 Assume that U and L are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and that
the following holds:
U11(r(z),z) − U12(r(z),z) ≥ 0 (3)
L11(r(z),z) − L12(r(z),z) ≥ 0 (4)
then there is exactly one pair of PSNEs.
The next result is devoted to comparing the two asymmetric PSNEs from
any given pair from the point of view of the players’ welfare. Given any pair
of asymmetric PSNEs, it is often of interest to determine circumstances where
a given equilibrium secures better payoﬀs for a player. In other words, under
what conditions would each player prefer the PSNE where he is the high or the
low-activity player? To this end, we need to impose a condition of monotonicity
on the payoﬀ function of the player in question along his opponent’s best reply
as stated in the following result, which lays out conditions for player 1 (say) to
prefer the PSNE where he is the low-activity player.9
Theorem 3.3 Let x∗ >y ∗,s ot h a t(x∗,y∗) and (y∗,x ∗) are equilibria in ∆U
and ∆L, respectively. If A1−A3 hold and moreover U(r1(y),y) and L(r1(y),y)
are increasing in y ∈ [0,c] then F(x∗,y∗) ≤ F(y∗,x ∗).
There is a dual statement giving conditions under which each player would
prefer the high-activity equilibrium, given any pair of PSNEs. Being obvious
from Theorem 3.3, it is omitted for the sake of brevity.
our systematic and robust jump across the diagonal, our ﬁndings are actually consistent with
the odd number result in a generic sense.
8As mentioned in the Section 1, assumptions A1 − A3 imply that our game admits a
symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, in the actual realization of such an
equilibrium, the two players will be heterogeneous with high, if not full, probability.
9This monotonicity assumption is clearly more general than assuming that each player’s
payoﬀ is increasing in the rival’s action. For an example illustrating this point, see von Stengel
(2003).
133.2 Applications
In this section we present examples of economic models that constitute spe-
cial cases of the general framework developed above. While the assumptions
validating Theorem 3.1 might at ﬁrst appear somewhat special, they are sat-
isﬁed in several ap r i o r iunrelated studies that have established endogenous
heterogeneity in strategic settings. Th e r ea r ea l s os o m es t u d i e sw h e r ea s y m -
metric equilibria are produced via a mechanism similar to our Theorem 3.1,
without being a special case in a formal sense. Going over some of these ex-
amples illustrates the unifying character of our results and allows us to provide
some contextual interpretations of endogenous heterogeneity, or our version of
symmetry-breaking.
3.2.1 R&D investment
The ﬁrst example is based on the model by Amir and Wooders (2000). Two a
priori identical ﬁrms with initial unit cost c are engaged in a two stage game
of R&D investment and production. In the ﬁrst stage, autonomous cost reduc-
tions x and y for ﬁrms 1 and 2, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a r ec h o s e n .T h en o v e lf e a t u r eo f
this study is that spillovers are postulated to ﬂow only from the more R&D
active ﬁrm to the rival, but not vice versa. The eﬀective (post-spillover) cost
reductions X and Y when x ≥ y are given by:




x with probability β
y with probability 1 − β
(5)
Second stage product market competition, be it Cournot or Bertrand, is assumed
to have a unique PSNE with equilibrium payoﬀsg i v e nb yΠ :[ 0 ,c]2 → R.10
Π(x,y) is the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm whose unit cost is the ﬁrst argument. f :
[0,c] → R is a known R&D cost schedule. Amir and Wooders (2000) assume
the following:
C1 Π and f are twice continuously diﬀerentiable
10This is a standard assumption in the literature.
14C2 Π is strictly submodular and Π1 (x,y) < 0 and Π2 (x,y) > 0
C3 Π(x,x) < Π(y,y) if x>y
C4 |Π1(x,x)| > |Π2(x,x)|,∀x ∈ [0,c]
C5 f0 (x) ≥ 0 and f(0) ≥ 0
C6 f0(0) < −βΠ2 (c,c) − Π1(c,c) and f0(c) > −(1 − β)Π1 (0,0)
The overall payoﬀ of ﬁrm 1,F(x,y), deﬁned as in (1), is given by the dif-
ference between its second stage proﬁta n dﬁrst stage R&D cost. The payoﬀ of
ﬁrm 2 is G(y,x) by symmetry.
U(x,y)=βΠ(c − x,c − x)+( 1− β)Π(c − x,c − y) − f (x) (6)
L(x,y)=βΠ(c − y,c− y)+( 1− β)Π(c − x,c − y) − f (x) (7)
We can easily check that assumptions A1,A2 and A3 indeed hold in or-
der to apply Theorem 3.1. U and L are continuous and diﬀerentiable because
they result from the sum of continuous and diﬀerentiable functions. U(x,x)=
L(x,x),∀x ∈ [0,c],s oF and G are continuous. A1 can be checked by using
the cross-partial test and the fact that Π(x,y) is submodular (Assumption C1).
Also, Using C2, and
U1 (x,x)=−[Π1 (c − x,c − x)+βΠ2 (c − x,c − x)] − f0 (x) (8)
L1 (x,x)=−(1 − β)Π1 (c − x,c − x) − f0(x) (9)
we obtain that U1(x,x) >L 1 (x,x), therefore A2 is veriﬁed.
From Theorem 3.1, we can conclude that payoﬀ functions for both players
are submodular and thus reaction curves are downward sloping and there exists
at least one PSNE. Moreover the reaction curves do not intersect the diagonal
and by C6,U 1 (0,0) > 0 and L1 (c,c) < 0, so there is no symmetric equilibrium
in x ∈ [0,c]. The uniqueness of a pair of asymmetric PSNEs is shown by
imposing conditions that secure that the reaction curves are contractions, so
that Theorem 3.2 can be applied. Similarly, extra conditions are needed to
15apply Theorem 3.3 and Amir and Wooders conclude that player 1 prefers the
equilibrium in ∆U (for details, see Amir and Wooders, 2000).
This model provides a good opportunity for a typical economic interpre-
tation of strategic endogenous heterogeneity in a context that is of particular
interest to business strategy scholars. Indeed that ﬁeld typically attaches a great
deal of importance to the innovation process and to its central role in dynamic
competition. The key driving force behind asymmetric equilibrium outcomes
here is the one-way nature of the spillover process. A ﬁrm will always react
by performing either less R&D than its rival knowing that it may free ride on
the diﬀerence in R&D levels, or, in case the rival’s R&D is simply too low, by
overtaking it. In this vision, ﬁrms will endogenously settle into R&D innova-
tor and imitator roles simply as a reﬂection of the nature of the R&D spillover
process. This critical diﬀerence arises as a consequence of strategic thinking
in a fully interactive setting: though facing equal and known opportunities in
all respects, ﬁrms emerge as fundamentally diﬀerent in all possible equilibria
of a robust and general model. In strategic settings, there may simply be no
single ”best choice” (to paraphrase Nelson, 1991) for all ex ante identical ﬁrms
facing the same available choices, simply because one ﬁrm’s choice has a direct
inﬂuence on what becomes best for its rivals.
This diﬀerence in one key component of ﬁrms’ overall strategies will then
be a causal factor, through natural complementarity-reinforcing developments,
for heterogeneity in other aspects of ﬁrms’ strategies, including in particular
ﬁrm size and organization (see Amir and Wooders, 1999 for details). This
perspective stands in sharp contrast to the explanation for inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences
characterized by idiosyncratic groping behavior on the part of ﬁrms and weak
interaction amongst them in a world of high uncertainty and complexity, as
often envisioned in the strategy literature.
163.2.2 Provision of Information
The second example deals with the provision of information in Bertrand oligopoly,
see Ireland (1993). Two ap r i o r isymmetric ﬁrms produce a homogeneous prod-
uct and play a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm sets the level of its
product information and in the second stage they compete in prices. Informa-
tion regards only the existence of the product. Consumers may obtain costless
information about prices of products that they know to exist. The number of
consumers is normalized to 1.T h e v a r i a b l e s x and y are the proportions of
consumers who know about product 1 and 2 respectively. Each consumer is not
w i l l i n gt op a yau n i tp r i c eh i g h e rt h a n1.F i r m1’s sales are given by:
Q1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
x if p1 <p 2
x −
xy
2 if p1 = p2
x − xy if p1 >p 2
(10)
For x = y =1the Bertrand oligopoly has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
at p1 = p2 =0 . If information is not full (x or y or both are less than 1),
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. There exists a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium given by the distribution function Gi (pi) that has the following






x if 1 − x ≤ p ≤ 1






y if 1 − x ≤ p ≤ 1
0 if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 − x
(11)
The overall payoﬀ for (say) ﬁrm 1 in the game, upon substituting the second





U(x,y)=x(1 − y) if x ≥ y
L(x,y)=x(1 − x), if x ≤ y
(12)
It is trivial to show that assumptions A1,A 2 and A3 are veriﬁed in this
example. There exists an equilibrium and this equilibrium cannot be symmetric
for p ∈ (0,1).M o r e o v e r U1 (0,0) > 0 and L1 (1,1) < 0. So we can conclude
from Theorem 3.1 that no symmetric equilibria exist for p ∈ [0,1] .
17Figure 2: Reaction curves are constant except for a jump down, which precludes
symmetric equilibrium.












1 if x ≤ 1/2
1/2 if x>1/2
(13)
Figure 2 illustrates that there exists exactly one pair of pure strategy Nash
equilibria, namely (1, 1
2) and (1
2,1) .
We can compare equilibria from the point of view of player 1, using the dual
to the Theorem 3.3. The payoﬀ function of player 1 when x ≤ y, is constant
along his best reply, i.e. L2(r1 (y),y)=0 . Therefore we conclude that player 1
prefers the equilibrium where he is more active.
4 Endogenous heterogeneity without monotonic
best replies
In the previous section we discussed symmetry breaking via strategic substitutes
and nonconcavity of the payoﬀ function. In this section we extend the analy-
sis from the previous section to encompass other forms of strategic interaction.
18The main diﬀerence is that agents’ strategies form (partially) strategic comple-
ments. This occurs when a more aggressive strategy from one agent rises the
other player’s marginal returns to increasing his own strategy. Consequently, an
increase of the opponent’s choice is responded to by an increase of own choice
variable. This property implies that best-replies are increasing in own action.
As stated above, strategic complementarities are partial in the sense that they
are not observed overall. Reaction curves are piecewise increasing, however due
to a symmetry breaking nonconcavity in the payoﬀ function, they possess a
jump down across the diagonal. The common aspect to the whole analysis is
the canyon shape of the agents’ payoﬀ functions along the 45o line. Once again,
a player would never optimally respond to an action of the rival by playing that
same action. Whereas in the previous section the submodularity of the payoﬀ
function (or alternatively the strategic substitutability) was a global feature, in
this section we cannot state global supermodularity (or strategic complemen-
tarity). The main consequence is that we cannot guarantee without further
assumptions the existence of a PSNE. Nevertheless, when it exists, it will never
be symmetric.
When strategies are strategic complements, there is no need to assume the
quasiconcavity of the payoﬀ function in order to guarantee the existence of a
PSNE. The reason is that existence might be based on the fact that reaction
curves are increasing and continuity plays no role. Likewise, when payoﬀ func-
tions are quasiconcave supermodularity is not crucial for arguing the existence of
a PSNE. When player’s payoﬀ function is partially quasiconcave and possesses a
nonconcavity along the diagonal, we obtain the same type of symmetry-breaking
already discussed. In this case, reaction curves are continuous (not necessarily
increasing), except for the jump across the diagonal. Existence of PSNE can be
assured (as before) via added conditions, however it is clear that no PSNE can
be symmetric.
We provide now the main results of this section, ﬁrst for the case in which
strategic complementarities are present and then for the case of partially qua-
siconcave payoﬀ functions.
194.1 The results
In this section we analyze the case in which the components of the payoﬀ func-
tion, U and L, are not submodular. We ﬁrst consider the case in which U and L
are supermodular and then the case where U and L do not have this property,
which is replaced by quasiconcavity.
Consider the following assumptions:
B1 U and L are supermodular.
B2 U and L are diﬀerentiable and U1(x,x) >L 1(x,x),∀x ∈ (0,c)
Deﬁne r1 (y) = argmax{U (x,y):( x,y) ∈ ∆U} and r1 (y) = argmax{L(x,y):
(x,y) ∈ ∆L}
B3 U2(r1 (y),y) <L 2(r1 (y),y),∀y ∈ Y
B4 U1(0,0) > 0,L 1(c,c) < 0
B5 U1 (x,0) > 0, ∀x<dand L1 (x,c) < 0, ∀x>d ,for d : r1(d − ε) >d>
r1(d + ε)
B1 says that on either side of the diagonal, but not necessarily globally,
each player’s marginal returns to increasing his action increase with the rival’s
action. B2 holds that each player’s payoﬀ, though globally continuous in the
two actions, has a valley-like shape along the diagonal. B3 is responsible for
the uniqueness of the jump in the reaction curves. B4 excludes the existence
of equilibria in (0,0) and (c,c). Finally, B5 restricts the reaction curves to a
compact subset of the action space which enables us to prove the existence of
an asymmetric PSNE.
These assumptions form a suﬃciently general framework to encompass many
of the studies mentioned in Section 1 as illustrated below. Furthermore, all
assumptions are possible to check in a particular model.
Lemma 4.1 If B1 − B4 hold, then there exists exactly one d ∈ [0,c] such that
r1(d − ε) >d>r 1(d + ε), ∀ε>0.
20This Lemma guarantees that the reaction curves possess a jump and that this
jump is unique. The ﬂavor of the proof is the following: given supermodularity
of U and L, we know that reaction curves are increasing in ∆U and in ∆L.
Assumption B2 implies that there is no interior symmetric equilibrium due to
the presence of a canyon along the diagonal. Furthermore, assumption B4 rules
out symmetric equilibrium on the boundary. This is equivalent to saying that
the reaction curves do not intersect the diagonal on the whole strategy space.
Hence, there must be a jump across the diagonal. Finally assumption B3,t h a t
entails an idea of monotonicity of maxima along y, guarantees that in case a
jump occurs, it is unique. From this Lemma we can conclude that the reaction
curves possess a jump across the diagonal in a point d a n dt h a to n c ei to c c u r s ,
the reaction curves never jump back again. The point d is useful to deﬁne
subsets of the strategy space, which are necessary in the next theorem.
The following theorem implies that no symmetric PSNE exists for a game
where assumptions B1−B5 hold and that a PSNE exists. From these premises
we can conclude that there are only asymmetric PSNEs.
Theorem 4.1 Assume that B1 − B5 hold, then there exist at least one pair of
asymmetric PSNEs and no symmetric one.
The intuition behind this result is the following: from Lemma 4.1 we have
that the reaction curves are partially increasing (as they increase in each side of
the diagonal) and possess a unique downward jump at point d. Since reaction
curves are not overall increasing we cannot guarantee without further assump-
tions the existence of a PSNE. Introducing assumption B5 guarantees that the
reaction functions are well deﬁned in R = {(x,y):d ≤ x ≤ c,0 ≤ y ≤ d},R⊂
∆U and R0 = {(x,y):0≤ x ≤ d,d ≤ y ≤ c},R 0 ⊂ ∆L, in the sense that
they are completely contained in these compact subsets of the strategy space.
We obtain, hence, increasing maps in compact sets and Tarski’s Fixed Point
Theorem can be applied to show that within these sets a PSNE exists.
Note that we can reorder one player ’s action set in a nonstandard way to
obtain a submodular game. Consider action space of (say) player 1 as (d,0] ∪
21Figure 3: Reaction curves are partially increasing, but posses an unique jump
down, which precludes any symmetric equilibrium.
[c,d), ordered from left to right. The other player’s action space order remains
without change. It can be veriﬁed, that the game satisfying B1 − B5 then
becomes a game of strategic substitutes.
Now consider another property of U and L.
B1’ U and L are quasi-concave.
The assumption B1 can be replaced by the assumption B10 which guarantees
that player’s best replies are continuous (not overall) and still the result holds.
In other words, the supermodularity of U and L is not necessary (even though
o f t e no b s e r v e di na p p l i c a t i o n s )f o rt h e existence of only asymmetric PSNE in
this framework. In particular, assuming that U and L are quasiconcave implies
that the reaction curves are partially continuous (even though not monotone)
and thus, as long as the unique jump across the diagonal exists and the reaction
curves are completely contained in compact subsets of the domain, we can show
the existence of asymmetric PSNE. Since monotonicity cannot be guaranteed
anymore Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem must be replaced by Brouwer’s Fixed
Point Theorem in showing the existence of PSNE.
Lemma 4.2 If B10 and B2 − B4 hold, then there exists exactly one d ∈ [0,c]
such that ∀ε>0: r1(d − ε) >d>r 1(d + ε),
22Theorem 4.2 Assume that B10 and B2−B5 hold then there exist at least one
pair of asymmetric PSNEs and no symmetric one.
The proofs of these results follow the same reasoning as the proofs of the
precedent ones, however, existence of PSNE is now guaranteed through the
application of Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem (which is suitable given that
payoﬀ functions are quasiconcave).
Uniqueness of a pair of equilibria can be shown if reaction functions are
contractions by using Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem as in the previous section.
A comparison of equilibria when payoﬀ functions are partially supermodular
(or quasiconcave) can be done in the same spirit of Theorem 3.3. Instead of
assuming A1 − A4 we assume B1 − B5( B10 − B5). In the proof, the second
inequality follows now from the fact that x∗ ≥ d and Assumption B3.11
Adopting the results of Echenique (2004), wherein the order on the action
spaces is not exogenously given would enlarge the scope of supermodular games.
In particular, since our game here has at least two PSNEs, one can always ﬁnd
a partial order such that it becomes a supermodular game (Echenique, 2004,
Theorem 5).
4.2 Applications: Quality Investment
We illustrate the results of this section with two papers dealing with quality
investment problems. The ﬁrst paper we analyze is Aoki and Prusa (1996). In
this paper, two identical ﬁrms produce products diﬀerentiated by quality, in a
two-stage setting. In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms 1 and 2 decide the level of quality
investment x ∈ [0,c] and y ∈ [0,c] respectively, and in the second stage they
simultaneously announce prices.12
Consumers are diversiﬁed in their willingness to pay for quality. Production
cost is assumed to be 0 and ﬁrm 1 (ﬁrm 2) incurs a cost of quality investment
11It is easy to see that Assumption B3 means that for z>d , U (r1 (z),z) <L(r1 (z),z).
12Aoki and Prusa (1996) consider unlimited quality investments. We impose the upper limit
c, arbitrarily big, such that the strategy spaces are compact.
23f(x)=kx2 £
f(y)=ky2¤
, k>0. A detailed study of the second stage equilib-
rium of this game can be found in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked
and Sutton (1982). The subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game can








(4x−y)2 − kx2 if x ≥ y
L(x,y)=
yx(y−x)
(4y−x)2 − kx2 if x<y
(14)
Now we can check whether assumptions of Theorem 4.1 are fulﬁlled. Given
that U and L are diﬀerentiable we can check supermodularity (Assumption B1)
by recurring to Topkis’s Characterization Theorem. Consider that U1(x,x)=
4
9 − 2x and L1 (x,x)=−1
9 − 2x, so U1 (x,x) >L 1 (x,x) which veriﬁes B2.T o










Since r1 (y) >y>r 1 (y) the condition B3 holds. We know, hence, that the
reaction curves are upward sloping except for a downward jump at a point d.
Since U(0,0) is not deﬁned we cannot check the ﬁrst part of B4 directly, we
must compute limx→0 U1 (x,x).W e o b t a i n limx→0 U1 (x,x)=4
9 > 0 which
means that increasing quality investment at point (0,0) is proﬁtable for both
ﬁrms. Point (0,0) is thus ruled out as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of





< 0. From Lemma 4.1 we have that if there is an
equilibrium, it cannot be symmetric in [0,c]
2.
To apply Theorem 4.1 we must also check, whether B5 is veriﬁed. To this
end, we must ﬁnd the point d where the reaction curve has a jump. If the
reaction curve is given implicitly, there is no algorithm to ﬁnd this point d,
however it is possible to ﬁnd it through numerical methods. In the case of the
model by Aoki and Prusa (1996), the point d is equal to 1
12k.I ti sp o s s i b l et o
compute that U1 (x,0) = 1
4 − 2kx ≥ 0 for x>dand that for suﬃciently big c,
L1 (x,c) = limy→∞ L1(x,y)=−2kx + 1
16 < 0 for x>d . So the assumptions
24of Theorem 4.1 are satisﬁed and we can conclude that there exist only asym-
metric equilibria in the game. Furthermore, reaction curves in this model are
contractions and so a unique pair of equilibria exists.
The second paper that can be analyzed under our framework is Motta (1993).
He develops two versions of a vertical product diﬀerentiation model, one with
ﬁxed and the other with variable cost of investment in quality. In each of them,
he compares price versus quality competition. The model with ﬁxed cost and
price competition can illustrate the results of this section. Considering the same







2 if x ≥ y
xyv2(y−x)
(4y−x)2 − x2
2 if x ≤ y
(16)
Where v is the upper limit of the set of consumer’s taste parameters. This
model is analogous to Aoki and Prusa (1996) if we let v =1and k = 1
2.A l lt h e
results follow directly from the above discussion.
5C o n v e x P a y o ﬀs
Certain features of the production technologies or consumer preferences may
lead to a situation where payoﬀ functions are convex. In particular, the pres-
ence of highly convex demand functions or strongly concave costs translating
intensely decreasing elasticity of demand or decreasing marginal costs might
have this eﬀect. This property of the payoﬀ f u n c t i o n si m p l i e st h a ta g e n t sp r e f e r
corner solutions. Moreover certain additional conditions on the payoﬀsm i g h t
generate asymmetric equilibria and even rule out the symmetric ones. In this
section we analyze a class of games in which players have convex payoﬀ functions
and only asymmetric PSNEs arise.
Let S =[ 0 ,c] be the strategy space of a player in a two-player game, Γ.
Consider F : S × S → R as the payoﬀ function of player 1. G(y,x)=F(x,y)
is the payoﬀ of player 2 because the game is ap r i o r isymmetric. Then we can
apply the following theorem to conclude about the properties of the equilibria
25of Γ.
Theorem 5.1 Assume that the following assumptions hold:
1. F is strictly quasi-convex in own strategy
2. F(c,0) >F(0,0) and F(0,c) >F(c,c)
Then, the game has no symmetric equilibrium and it has exactly one pair of
asymmetric equilibria given by (0,c) and (c,0).
Proof. From the deﬁnition of strict quasi-convexity, we know that:
F(λz1 +( 1− λ)z2) < max{F(z1),F(z2)},∀z1,z 2 ∈ S × S
Let z1 =( 0 ,y) and z2 =( c,y), then we know that any x ∈ (0,c) yields a
lower payoﬀ than x =0or x = c, ∀y ∈ [0,c]. This means that ∀y ∈ [0,c],
r1 (y)=0or r1 (y)=c. Analogously, for player 2 we have the same result, due
to symmetry.
Finally, from Assumption 2 we have that (c,0) and (0,c) are the only PSNEs
of the game.
Figure 4 illustrates the results of this section. Notice that we depicted reac-
tion curves which are not continuous, speciﬁcally, they possess an odd number
of jumps. This is a direct consequence of the Assumptions 1 and 2 that imply
either that the reaction curves are continuous, or that, if they jump, they must
jump an odd number of times.
5.1 Applications
This theorem generalizes the results of Amir (2000) and Mills and Smith (1996),
whose models are usually presented within the literature about endogenous het-
erogeneity of ﬁrms.13 In these papers it is considered a two-stage duopoly game.
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms make long term investment decisions that aﬀect the pro-
duction costs. In the second stage, ﬁrms compete àl aCournot. Both ﬁrms face
13Another example where the game can be reduced to a two person normal form game
is presented in Boyer and Moreaux (1997). Conditions for the non-existence of symmetric
equilibria are the same, even if the payoﬀ function is not convex.
26Figure 4: Quasi-convexity of the payoﬀs implies that players prefer corner solu-
tions.
a linear demand function and for some parameterization of the cost functions,
proﬁts are convex in own quantity. In both papers it is then concluded that if
some conditions on the parameters hold, asymmetric equilibria might arise. It
is easily shown that the conditions presented in the papers can be deduced from
the assumptions of Theorem 5.1.
6E x t e n s i o n s
Most of the results of the previous sections depend on some form of monotonic-
ity of the reaction curves. We used the cardinal notions of complementarity
and substitutability to obtain this property mainly due to its convenient char-
acterization through the cross partial derivatives of the payoﬀ functions. Super-
modularity and submodularity are cardinal notions that are not preserved by
monotone transformations of the objective function. The usefulness of ordinal
properties under which comparative statics results are invariant is clear. Mil-
grom and Shannon (1994) proved that the result of Topkis holds when single
crossing property substitutes supermodularity of the objective function. In this
section we show that our results can be generalized to the ordinal deﬁnitions of
complementarity.
27Let F be deﬁned as in (1) and consider the following assumptions:
A10 U and L have dual single crossing property
A4 U2(r1(y),y) <L 2(r1(y),y),∀y ∈ [0,c]
The Assumption A10 is alternative to Assumption A1 deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n3
and provides the ordinal condition for the reaction curves to be decreasing. As-
sumption A4 expresses monotonicity of U and L with respect to the opponent’s
action along the best replies.
We now show the main result of this section in the following steps: ﬁrst we
conclude about decreasing best-replies; then we observe that there is a downward
jump in the reaction function at point d and that this jump is unique. Finally
we use Topkis ﬁxed point theorem to conclude of the existence of equilibria in
the subsets of the strategy space deﬁned using point d.
Finally we treat the setting of Section 4, extending its results to the ordinal
deﬁnitions of complementarity.
Theorem 6.1 If A10,A2,A3 and A4 hold, then the game Γ has at least one
pair of asymmetric PSNEs and no symmetric one.
The idea of the proof is that within ∆U and ∆L the dual single crossing
property of the payoﬀ function F holds from assumption A10. As Milgrom
and Shannon (1994) showed, the dual single crossing property allows us to
draw the same conclusions as the submodularity of the payoﬀ function in terms
of monotonicity of the reaction curves. Furthermore the dual single crossing
property has the advantage of being more general and preserved by monotonic
transformations. Then assumption A2 implies that there exists a jump down in
the reaction curves at a certain point d and A4 implies that this jump is unique.
With point d we deﬁne compact subsets of the strategy space where reaction
curves are decreasing and thus we can guarantee the existence of a PSNE by
Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem.
Some results from Section 4 can also be extended into an ordinal version.
Let F be deﬁned as in (1) and consider the following assumption:
28B100 U and L have the single crossing property
Theorem 6.2 If the assumptions B100 and B2 − B5 hold, then there exist at
least one pair of asymmetric PSNEs and no symmetric one.
From Milgrom and Shannon’s Theorem Assumption B100 implies that re-
action curves are partially increasing in ∆U and ∆L. From this fact and as
long as they are well deﬁned in a compact subset of the strategy space, we can
obtain existence of PSNEs. The valley-shape of the proﬁt precludes symmetric
equilibria in the same spirit as Theorem 4.1.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Our theorems assert that, under speciﬁc conditions, heterogeneity in agent’s
behavior might arise even when they are ap r i o r iidentical. This paper con-
stitutes, hence, a contribution to the discussion about the sources of diversity
across economic agents and disparities in economic performances. While pre-
vious literature stands on arguments related to multiplicity of equilibria and
strategic complementarities (Cooper, 1999) or on strategic substitutability and
stability of equilibria (Matsuyama, 2002), our approach stands on the existence
of a fundamental nonconcavity of the payoﬀ function and on some form of strate-
gic substitutability. It is, thus, similar in spirit to Matsuyama’s work. However,
we show that endogenous heterogeneity does not rely on the idea that only
stable equilibria are observable as in Matsuyama. With respect to Cooper’s ap-
proach, where agents can still choose symmetrically, our results guarantee that
symmetric equilibria can never arise in a two player setting. Even though we
have, in our model some form of strategic substitutability (notice that when
talking about two-player games strategic substitutability can be converted into
complementarity through a simple inversion of one agent’s strategy space), the
critical assumption for the inexistence of symmetric equilibria is the noncon-
cavity of the payoﬀs. In fact, we show that strategic substitutability can be
replaced by partial quasiconcavity and still the results follow.
29An alternative explanation for endogenous heterogeneity can be found in
business strategy literature. Our result sc a na l s ob ec o n s i d e r e da sar e s p o n s et o
its critique as asymmetries arise here in a completely deterministic and rational
setup. We should thus expect that heterogeneity generated in such a framework
can be the origin of long-term diversity.
308A p p e n d i x
8.1 Summary of supermodular/submodular games
We give an overview of the main deﬁnitions and results in the theory of su-
permodular games that are used in the paper, in a simpliﬁed setting that is
suﬃcient for our purposes. Details may be found in Topkis (1978).14
Let I1 and I2 be compact real intervals and F : I1 × I2 → R. F is
(strictly) supermodular if ∀x1,x 2 ∈ I1,x 2 >x 1 and ∀y1,y 2 ∈ I2,y 2 >y 1 we
have F(x2,y 2) − F(x2,y 1)(>) ≥ F(x1,y 2) − F (x1,y 1).Fis (strictly) submod-
ular if −F is (strictly) supermodular.
Theorem 8.1 (Topkis’s Characterization Theorem) Let F be twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable. Then
(i) F12 = ∂2F
∂x∂y ≥ 0 [ ≤ 0]f o ra l lx,y ⇔ F is supermodular [submodular].
(ii) F12 = ∂2F
∂x∂y > 0 [< 0 ] for all x,y ⇒ F is strictly supermodular [sub-
modular].
The supermodularity property is not preserved by monotonic transforma-
tions of the function F. An alternative notion (ordinal) is the single crossing
property deﬁned as follows: F has single crossing property [dual single crossing
property] in (x,y) if ∀x1,x 2 ∈ I1,x 2 >x 1 and ∀y1,y 2 ∈ I2,y 2 >y 1 we have
F(x1,y 2) − F (x1,y 1) ≥ 0[≤ 0] ⇒ F(x2,y 2) − F(x2,y 1) ≥ 0[≤ 0].
The single crossing property does not have a correspondent diﬀerential char-
acterization and thus it is often more diﬃcult to check. Now we present the
main monotonicity theorems.
Theorem 8.2 (Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem) If F is continuous in y
and (strictly) supermodular [submodular] in (x,y),t h e nargmaxy∈I2 F(x,y) has
(all of its) maximal and minimal selections increasing [decreasing] in x ∈ I1.
14Other aspects of the theory may be found in Topkis (1979), Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
and Vives (1990).
31Theorem 8.3 (Milgrom and Shannon) The conclusion of Topkis’s Theo-
rem continues to hold when supermodularity [submodularity] is replaced by the
[dual] single crossing property.
We can introduce now the notion of supermodular game and of its properties.
A two player game is supermodular (submodular) if both payoﬀ functions are
continuous, supermodular (submodular) and both action spaces are compact
real intervals. 15 The ﬁxed point theorems associated with this framework are
due to Tarski (1955).
Theorem 8.4 (Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem) Let f : I1 × I2 → I1 × I2
be an increasing function, then f has a ﬁxed point.
Theorem 8.5 A two player supermodular (submodular) game has a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium.
In general, this theory dispenses with assumptions of concavity or diﬀeren-
tiability of payoﬀ functions, making it an extremely general framework to study
the properties of equilibria.
8.2 Proofs of Section 3
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is organized as follows: we begin with proving four
preliminary lemmas, and then present the main proof in two steps: ﬁrst we show
existence of PSNE and afterwards that all PSNEs must be asymmetric.
The ﬁrst lemma states that for a small enough square of points on the
diagonal we have submodularity.
Lemma 8.1 Consider the following points as depicted in ﬁgure 5. If A1 − A2
hold, then for small enough α>0:U(x,x − α) − U(x − α,x − α) ≥ L(x,x) −
L(x − α,x),∀x ∈ [0,c].
15Compactness is not necessary, it is required in order to use a simpliﬁed version of Tarski’s
Fixed Point Theorem, without referring to lattices.
32Proof. (Lemma 8.1) Take any point (x,x) on the diagonal, belonging to the
domain of F.F o rα>0 small enough
U1(x,x) ' U(x + α,x) − U(x,x) and L1(x,x) ' (x,x) − L(x − α,x). (17)
Hence, from A2:
U(x + α,x) − U(x,x) >L (x,x) − L(x − α,x). (18)
From A1 we know that
U(x + α,x − α) − U(x,x − α) ≥ U(x + α,x) − U(x,x). (19)
Take b ε>0 such that
U(x + α,x) − U(x,x) ≥ L(x,x) − L(x − α,x)+b ε. (20)




, ∃δ>0 such that








, ∃δ>0 such that




This allows us to establish that:
(U(x + α,x − α) − U(x,x − α)) − (U(x,x − α) − U(x − α,x − α)) ≤ 2ε ≤ b ε
(21)
since, for |A| <εand |B| <ε ,t h e nA − B<2ε.
Rewriting (21),
U(x + α,x − α) − U(x,x − α) ≤ U(x,x − α) − U(x − α,x − α)+b ε. (22)
33Figure 5: Square of the length α.
Finally, summarizing, we have:
L(x,x) − L(x − α,x)+b ε ≤
≤ U(x + α,x) − U(x,x) ≤
≤ U(x + α,x − α) − U(x,x − α) ≤
≤ U(x,x − α) − U(x − α,x − α)+b ε
where, the ﬁrst inequality comes from (20), the second one from (19) and the
last one from (22). So we obtain,
U(x,x − α) − U(x − α,x − α)+b ε ≥ (x,x) − L(x − α,x)+b ε. (23)
Subtracting b ε from both sides ends the proof.
The next lemma extends the property of submodularity of F form the small
square of length α to any square with two vertices on the diagonal.
Lemma 8.2 If Lemma 8.1 holds, then for any square with points in the diago-
nal, such as depicted in ﬁgure 7, we have,
F(z,x) − F(z,z) ≥ F(x,x) − F (x,z).
Proof. (Lemma 8.2) Consider the square formed by the four points deﬁned in
the lemma. Divide this square into rectangles such that their height is equal to
34the original height of the square and its length is not bigger than α, as deﬁned in
Lemma 8.1. We will now show that for points in the vertices of such rectangles
the thesis holds and a fortiori it is possible to obtain the conclusion for the
whole square. Figure 6 illustrates the proof.
Let x − z = kα,w h e r ek ∈ R,a n dα>0 is small enough. Now consider the
rectangle deﬁned by the following points (x,x),(x,x−α), (z,x) and (z,x− α).
From Lemma 8.1 we know that
F(x,x − α) − F(x − α,x − α) ≥ F(x,x) − F(x − α,x)
Also, from A1 we know that
F(x − α,x − α) − F(z,x− α) ≥ F(x − α,x) − F (z,x)
Adding these two inequalities we obtain that
F(x,x − α) − F(z,x− α) ≥ F(x,x) − F (z,x) (24)
Repeating the procedure, consider the rectangle deﬁned by: (x,x − α), (x,x − 2α),
(z,x− α), (z,x− 2α).F r o mA1 we know that:
F (x,x − 2α) − F (x − α,x − 2α) ≥ F(x,x − α) − F(x − α,x − α)
and also
F (x − 2α,x − 2α) − F (z,x− 2α) ≥ F(x − 2α,x − α) − F(z,x− α).
U s i n gL e m m a8 . 1w ek n o wt h a t
F(x − α,x − 2α) − F(x − 2α,x − 2α) ≥ F(x − α,x − α) − F (x − 2α,x − α)
Adding the three inequalities we obtain:
F (x,x − 2α) − F (z,x− 2α) ≥ F(x,x − α) − F(z,x− α)
From (24) we obtain
F (x,x − 2α) − F (z,x− 2α) ≥ F(x,x) − F (z,x)
35Figure 6: Partition of the square whose vertices coincide with the diagonal.
We can repeat this argument k times until getting a rectangle whose length is
not bigger than α. Once again we apply assumption A1 and Lemma 8.1 to show
that submodularity holds for this rectangle as well and we can conclude that,
F(x,z) − F(z,z) ≥ F (x,x) − F (x,z).
Hence submodularity is satisﬁed for any square with vertices coinciding with
the diagonal.
The following Lemma establishes that the analysis of submodularity of any
rectangle formed by four points of the domain [0,c]2 can be reduced to the
analysis of submodularity for points placed in such a way that they form a
square with vertices coinciding with the diagonal.
Lemma 8.3 If A1 and A2 hold, then F and G are submodular on [0,c]2.
Proof. (Lemma 8.3) Due to the kink along the diagonal, one cannot invoke
Topkis’s simple cross-partial test (Topkis’s Characterization Theorem in the
Appendix) to verify submodularity of F and G. Instead, we use deﬁnition of
submodularity for any conﬁguration of four points in the domain, constituting
a rectangle. If the rectangle is completely contained in either ∆U or ∆L,t h e
submodularity condition follows from A1. Every other situation can be reduced
by adding subrectangles, each of which lying fully in either ∆U or ∆L,t ot h e
36Figure 7: If F satisﬁes submodularity on the square on the diagonal, this implies
it satisﬁes submodularity on the rectangle.
situation depicted in ﬁgure 5 as we now show, say for F. Consider the case of
ﬁgure 7 with the four points (x,z), (z,z), (x,y), (z,y) as shown. With z<x<y ,
we know from A1 that, since F = U on ∆U,
F(x,y) − F(x,x) ≥ F(z,y) − F(z,x).
From Lemma 8.2, submodularity holds for the conﬁguration of the square (x,x),
(z,x), (z,z), (z,x), hence we have
F(x,x) − F (x,z) ≥ F(z,x) − F(z,z).
Adding the two inequalities yields
F(x,y) − F (x,z) ≥ F(z,y) − F(z,z),
which is just the deﬁnition of submodularity for the original points (x,z), (z,z),
(x,y) and (z,y).
It can be shown via analogous steps that the submodularity of F for any
other conﬁguration of points can be reduced to showing submodularity for
squares with two vertices on the diagonal. The details are left out.
The next result allows us to conclude that the two reaction curves always
admit a discontinuity that skips over the diagonal, a key step for our endogenous
heterogeneity result.
37Lemma 8.4 Given A1−A3, there exists exactly one point d ∈ (0,c),s u c ht h a t
ri(d − ε) >d>r i(d + ε),i=1 ,2.
Proof. (Lemma 8.4) From Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem and Lemma 8.3 , all
the selections from the best reply correspondences are downward sloping. Hence,
both ri(d−ε) and ri(d+ε) exist for any selection of ri and are independent of
the selection.
From assumption A3,w ek n o wt h a t(0,0) / ∈ Graph ri and (c,c) / ∈ Graph ri
(i.e. ri does not go through (0,0) or (c,c)). These two properties imply that ri
cannot be identically 0 or c.
We next show that the reaction correspondence r1 (say) cannot ever cross the
45o line at an interior point, i.e. in (0,c). The generalized ﬁrst order condition
for a maximum of F ( s a y )t oo c c u ra tap o i n t(x,x) with x ∈ (0,c), which applies
even in the absence of diﬀerentiability, is that U1 (x,x) ≤ L1 (x,x). Assumption
A2 rules out this case . Hence no x ∈ (0,c) can ever be a best reply to itself,
meaning that the reaction curves do not cross the 45o line at any interior point.
Since r1 starts strictly above 0 (for y =0 )and ends strictly below c (for
y = c), the above properties of r1 imply that there exists exactly one d ∈ (0,c)
such that r1(d − ε) >d>r 1(d + ε˙ ). In words, there must exist a jump in the
best reply function past the diagonal as in ﬁgure 1.
Using the Lemmas 8.3 and 8.4 we can now prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof. (Theorem 3.1) From Lemma 8.3 we have overall submodularity of the
payoﬀ function. This guarantees that a PSNE exists.
Consider now the behavior of the reaction curves in the area ∆U.T h e
same conclusion follows for ∆L by symmetry. Deﬁne the following restricted
reaction curves: r1|∆U(y):[ 0 ,d] → [d,c] and r2|∆U(x):[ d,c] → [0,d] both
decreasing as implied by Lemma 8.3. Deﬁne the mapping B :[ d,c] → [d,c],
B(x)=r1|∆U ◦r2|∆U(x), which is increasing given that each of r1|∆U and r2|∆U
is decreasing. From Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, we know that there exists
¯ x such that B(¯ x)=r1|∆U ◦ r2|∆U(¯ x), therefore (¯ x,r2 (¯ x)|∆U) is a PSNE. From
Lemma 8.4, there is no symmetric PSNE in [0,c]. Hence, there must exist at
38least one pair of asymmetric PSNEs.
Theorem 3.2 rules out the existence of multiple pairs of asymmetric equilib-
ria.
Proof. (Theorem 3.2) Once again we concentrate on the area ∆U. Conclusions
follow for the area ∆L by symmetry. Whenever r1 [r2] is interior, ﬁrst order con-
dition U1 (r1 (y),y)=0[ L1 (r2 (x),x)=0 ], together with the implicit function
theorem and the assumptions (3) and (4), implies that r1 [r2] is diﬀerentiable
in ∆U and that r0
1 (y)=−
U12(r1(y),y)




Hence, r1(y)|∆U and r2 (x)|∆U are contractions. Using Banach’s ﬁxed point
theorem we can conclude that there exists exactly one pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in ∆U.16 In the same way there exists exactly one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in ∆L. C o n c l u d i n g ,w eh a v ee x a c t l yo n ep a i ro fp u r es t r a t e g yN a s h
equilibrium.
Finally we provide a proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof. (Theorem 3.3) Since x∗ >d>y ∗, we have F(x∗,y∗)=U(x∗,y∗) and
F(y∗,x ∗)=L(y∗,x ∗).A l s o U(r1(d),d)=L(r1(d),d) if d denotes the unique
point of jump of reaction curve between ∆U and ∆L,a sd e ﬁn e di nL e m m a8 . 4 .
Then
F(x∗,y∗)=U(x∗,y∗)=
= U(r1(y∗),y∗) ≤ U(r1(d),d)=
= L(r1(d),d) ≤ L(r1(x∗),x ∗)=L(y∗,x ∗)=F(y∗,x ∗)
where both inequalities follow from the monotonicity of U(r1(y),y) and L(r1(y),y).
8.3 Proofs of Section 4
First we prove Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 since these proofs are similar. We
then move to proving Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
16(Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem): Let S ⊂ Rn be closed and f : S → S be a contraction
mapping, then there exists x ∈ S : f(x)=x.
39Proof. (Lemma 4.1) We consider the area ∆U.F r o mB1 and Topkis’s Monotonic-
ity Theorem, we know that the reaction curves are increasing. The generalized
ﬁrst order condition for a maximum to occur in the point (x,x) in the absence
of diﬀerentiability of F (and G, by symmetry) is that U1 (x,x) ≤ L1 (x,x). As-
sumption B2 rules out this possibility so we have that no y (nor x), belonging
to (0,c), can be best reply to itself, meaning that the reaction curves do not
cross the 45o line. Assumption B4 excludes that 0 can be a best reply to 0 and
that c can be a best reply to c. Hence, there must exist a d ∈ [0,c], such that
r1(d − ε) >d>r 1(d + ε).
To exclude the possibility of another jump we use assumption B3. Consider
r1(y) and r1(y) deﬁn e da si nS e c t i o n4 .D e n o t eW(y)=L(r1(y),y) and V (y)=
U(r1(y),y). From the Envelope Theorem,
∂W(y)
y = L2(r1(y),y),a n d
∂V(y)
y =
U2(r1(y),y). Hence, when B3 holds, we know that W increases in y quicker
then V does. It means that when the overall reaction curve jumps down along
the diagonal, it never jumps up again.
Proof. (Lemma 4.2 ) If B10 holds reaction curves are continuous in ∆U and
in ∆L. B2 and B4 rules out the possibility that F (and G, by symmetry) has
am a x i m u mi nap o i n t[x,x] , that secures that the reaction curve must have a
jump down in a point d ∈ [0,c]. A si nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a4 . 1 ,B3 rules out
other possible upward jumps between ∆L and ∆U.
We may now show that only asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria exist.
Proof. (Theorem 4.1) Consider R ⊂ ∆U as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n4 . D e ﬁne as
before the restricted reaction curves as r1(y)|∆U and r2(x)|∆U. From assumption
B5, the best reply of player 1 to y =0cannot be less than d as U is decreasing in
x for y =0when x<d .For y>0, and given assumption B1 (supermodularity),
Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem allows us to conclude that the best reply of 1
is increasing. Hence r1(y)|∆U ∈ R. Seemingly the best reply of player 2 for
x = c cannot exceed d as L is decreasing in y when x = c. Also by Topkis’s,
the reaction curve is an increasing map. Therefore r2(x)|∆U ∈ R. Consider the
mapping, B : R → R such that B(x,y)=( r1(y),r 2(x)). B(x,y) is an increasing
correspondence, given that both its components are increasing. R is a compact
40set and hence we may use Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem to conclude that there
exists a pair (¯ x, ¯ y) such that B(¯ x, ¯ y)=( r1(¯ y),r 2(¯ x)). (¯ x, ¯ y) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Finally, by Lemma 4.1 we know that no equilibrium can be symmetric.
Proof. (Theorem 4.2) Deﬁne R, r1(y)|∆U and r2(x)|∆U as before. From
assumption B5,r 1(y)|∆U ∈ R and r2(x)|∆U ∈ R and from assumption B10
they are continuous. Consider the mapping B : R → R such that B(x,y)=
(r1(y),r 2(x)). B is a continuous correspondence, given that both its compo-
nents are continuous, R is a compact set and hence we may use Brouwer’s
Fixed Point Theorem to conclude that there exists a pair (¯ x, ¯ y) such that
B(¯ x, ¯ y)=( r1(¯ y),r 2(¯ x)). (¯ x, ¯ y) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
By Lemma 4.2 we know that no equilibrium can be symmetric.
8.4 Proofs of Section 6
To prove the theorem we ﬁrst formulate a useful lemma.
Lemma 8.5 If A10,A2 and A4 hold, then there exist exactly one point d ∈ [0,c]
such that r1(d − ε) >d>r 1(d + ε),ε>0.
Proof. (Lemma 8.5) Consider ∆U.F r o mA10 and Topkis’s Monotonicity The-
orem we know that reaction curve is decreasing in this area. The generalized
ﬁrst order condition for a maximum to occur in (x,x) is (in the absence of dif-
ferentiability in this point) U1(x,x) ≤ L1(x,x).A s s u m p t i o nA2 rules out this
possibility, thus no x ∈ (0,c) can be a best response to itself. Moreover, neither
(0,0) nor (c,c) can be an equilibrium, since from A3 follows, that for player 1
it is always proﬁtable to deviate from any of these points. Hence, the reaction
curve does not cross the 45o line, and there must exist a point, call it d ∈ [0,c]
such that r1(d − ε) >d>r 1(d + ε).
Now, we prove uniqueness of this point. Consider r1(y) and r1(y) deﬁned
as in Section 4. Denote W(y)=L(r1(y),y) and V (y)=U(r1(y),y).F r o mt h e
Envelope Theorem,
∂W(y)
y = L2(r1(y),y),a n d
∂V(y)
y = U2(r1(y),y). Hence, if
41A3 holds, we know that W increases in y quicker then V does. It means that
when the overall reaction curve jumps down along the diagonal, it never jumps
up again.
Proof. (Theorem 6.1) Consider restricted reaction curves r1|∆U(y) and r2|∆U(x),
both decreasing as implied by A10 and Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem. From
Lemma 8.5 and the monotonicity it follows that c ≥ r1|∆U(0) ≥ r1|∆U(d) >d
and 0 <r 2|∆U(0) ≤ r2|∆U(d) ≤ d, therefore r1|∆U(y):[ 0 ,d] → [d,c] and
r2|∆U(x):[ d,c] → [0,d] are well deﬁned. Deﬁne the mapping B :[ d,c] → [d,c],
B(x)=r1|∆U ◦r2|∆U(x), which is increasing given that each of r1|∆U and r2|∆U
is decreasing. From Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, we know that there exists ¯ x
such that B(¯ x)=r1|∆U ◦ r2|∆U(¯ x), therefore (¯ x,r2 (¯ x)|∆U) is a PSNE.
From Lemma 8.5, there is no symmetric PSNE in [0,c]. Hence, there must
e x i s ta tl e a s to n ep a i ro fP S N E s .
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